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Abstract 
 
Ellis et al. bring an evolutionary perspective to bear on adolescent risky behavioral development, 
clinical practice, and public policy. They offer important insights that: 1) some risky behaviors 
may be adaptive for the individual and the species by being hard-wired due to fitness benefits; 
and 2) interventions might be more successful if they move with, rather than against, the natural 
tendencies of an adolescent. Ellis et al. criticize the field of developmental psychopathology, but 
we see the two fields as complementary. Their position would be enhanced by integrating it with 
contemporary perspectives on dynamic cascades through which normative behavior turns into 
genuinely maladaptive outcomes, dual processes in adolescent neural development, and 
adolescent decision-making. Finally, they rightly note that innovation is needed in interventions 
and policies toward adolescent problem behavior. 
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Evolutionary analyses of human development have gained increasing prominence in 
recent years by offering compelling accounts of the adaptive logic underlying observed patterns 
of psychobiological responding to variations in environmental experience. The lead theoretical 
article by Ellis and colleagues in this special section applies this critical lens to the problem of 
adolescent risky behavior, arguing that the well-documented propensity of adolescents to engage 
in high-risk behaviors represents a functional adaptation to the developmentally salient demands 
of the adolescent period, namely to maximize social status and mating opportunities.  This 
evolutionary perspective on adolescent development offers hope of novel insights and 
intervention hypotheses that could inform a perplexing field.  Because of contemporary 
challenges to support adolescents in general, and those who are especially troubled and troubling 
in particular, this hope is welcome.  
Ellis et al. describe adolescence as a high-stakes transition from the safety net of one’s 
parents to the bold-and-brave world of adulthood. One fact of contemporary society that makes 
the arguments by Ellis et al. even more salient is that the period of adolescence has become 
longer than ever. The age of pubertal onset has moved earlier by an average of one month per 
decade over the past century, and early exposure to the world’s allures has been made ubiquitous 
by the internet. At the end of adolescence, financial independence, marriage, and stable career, 
all signs of adulthood, are not typically achieved until age 25 or later. The rocky ride is longer 
than ever. 
Ellis et al. offer at least two insights that all developmentalists will be wise to embrace: 
first, that some of the seemingly dysfunctional risky behavior exhibited by adolescents may 
actually be functional, and, second, that interventionists might be more successful if they move 
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with, rather than against, adolescents’ goals.  
Before the benefits of this analysis can be realized, however, we must address several 
problems in the authors’ framing of their argument that threaten to obscure readers’ 
understanding of the “lay of the land” of current research on adolescent risk-taking behavior. 
Normative and Extreme Behavior in Adolescence 
Consistent with the Ellis et al. evolutionary analysis, mounting empirical work describing 
age-related changes in neurobehavioral function occurring across the transition from childhood 
to adulthood supports the view of adolescents as developmentally “primed” for risky behavior.  
Around the time of puberty, the brain appears increasingly sensitive to social and emotional 
rewards, while neural developments that help to consolidate impulse-control skills are not 
complete until the late teens or early twenties.  This “maturational gap” is thought to heighten 
adolescents’ susceptibility toward impulsive risk taking, especially within peer contexts, a 
behavioral phenotype that may confer some historical fitness advantage to adolescents 
themselves (e.g., via leveraging of social status and mating opportunities) and/or the species at 
large (i.e., via risky exploration of new territory and avoidance of inbreeding) (for a review, see 
Steinberg, 2008).    
Given the broad congruence of the Ellis et al. perspective with these well-known and 
influential models, we find it perplexing that the authors frame their analysis as a counter-
position to current research on adolescent risk behavior. We find this critique problematic on 
three main counts. First, the use of developmental psychopathology as a disciplinary foil to 
characterize current research on adolescent risk behavior ignores the theoretical diversity of the 
field, which incorporates contributions from prevention science, public health, judgment and 
decision making, developmental psychopathology, and developmental science more generally. 
5		
Second, alongside this overly narrow identification of the field’s theoretical orientation, Ellis et 
al. utilize an overly broad view of the boundaries of “risk behavior” as a topic of inquiry. 
Whereas the field has traditionally focused on behaviors with obvious potential for negative 
consequences to adolescents’ health and well-being (e.g., unsafe sex, driving recklessly or while 
intoxicated, substance use, illegal behavior), Ellis et al. focus much of their argument on the 
status-enhancing functions of bullying (see “Key Insight #2), a class of behaviors rarely 
described by developmental scientists as a paradigmatic example of either risk taking or 
psychopathology.   Although this portrait of the adolescent risk-taking literature as dominated by 
developmental psychopathologists attempting to pathologize all undesirable behaviors may 
enhance the rhetorical punch of the Ellis et al. argument, we believe it is an inaccurate and 
needlessly provocative critique of a genuinely multidisciplinary field. 
Finally, the Ellis et al. critique of developmental psychopathology minimizes the 
contribution of that field to our understanding of individual differences. They cast the 
developmental psychopathology perspective as over-emphasizing psychopathology and offer, 
instead, a view of the functional benefits of risky behaviors for typically developing adolescents. 
Perhaps the optimum is in between. The insight of developmental psychopathology has been that 
some abnormal adolescent behaviors can be understood as normal behavior gone awry. The links 
between the normal and the abnormal are important insights that an exclusive focus on one or the 
other will miss. Thus, we believe that individual differences are crucial and that juxtaposing 
normative adolescent development with a dysfunctional extreme is important. 
The Ellis et al. perspective would benefit from highlighting two points that are consistent 
with both developmental psychopathology and evolutionary theory. First, as Ellis et al. 
acknowledge, normative patterns of adolescent behavior (e.g., novelty seeking) that are adaptive 
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from an evolutionary perspective (e.g., exploration of new territory may have increased fitness) 
may or may not have adaptive benefits for health and well-being in contemporary contexts.  
Whereas modestly risky behaviors might continue to be adaptive by promoting the withdrawal 
from one’s family of origin and the transition to adulthood, we must not confuse them with the 
clearly maladaptive extremes of risky behavior.  It is not adaptive in contemporary society to 
play drinking games and then drive an automobile down the wrong side of a highway, it is not 
adaptive for a lonely 14-year-old girl to offer herself indiscriminately and sexually to older boys, 
and it is not adaptive for a gang of teenage boys to bully and sexually coerce a 12-year-old girl. 
Although we might gain insight and appreciation for these behaviors by understanding their 
social and evolutionary context, and although their biological roots might have been selected by 
evolution many years ago, these behaviors are maladaptive in today’s society.  
Second, diverse individual differences are consistent with, even hypothesized by, 
evolutionary theory, because they keep the species ready to respond to diverse environmental 
challenges. Curiously, Ellis et al. do not emphasize the genuinely novel contribution of 
evolutionary theory that it might be functional for the species to retain diverse characters in order 
to protect against unexpected environmental challenges. For example, although impulsive 
decision-makers may adapt poorly to contemporary normative environments, they might be best 
equipped to respond to certain emergencies. Also, although unconventional thinkers might fail in 
typical educational settings, they might be the “genius discoverers” if given opportunity. It is 
adaptive for the species to retain this genetic diversity. Thus, the task of the socializing 
environment is not to “weed out” unsavory characters but rather to maximize gene-environment 
fit. 
In trying to cast risky behaviors as normative, Ellis et al. offer the insight that “a given 
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choice might seem dysfunctional according to others’ views of how to behave but still be the best 
choice for the person in question” (p. 2). We agree completely that this insight is pertinent, but 
the “best choice” from one’s own perspective does not imply the optimal choice for that person, 
especially in the long term. Social information processing models of deviant behavior in 
adolescence (e.g., Dodge, 2006) describe the aggressive actor’s perspective that a personal 
history of maltreatment can lead one to become hypervigilant to hostile cues from others, 
attribute malevolent intent to others even in ambiguous circumstances, generate self-defensive 
goals, and evaluate the immediate outcomes of retaliatory aggression as favorable enough to be 
the “best choice” in a particular situation, even if the long-term outcomes are incarceration and 
dysfunction. Such a description helps us understand the phenomenology of the aggressive 
adolescent without rendering the behavior as healthy. For the chronically aggressive adolescent, 
the pattern is tragic. 
Evolutionary Theory and Adolescent Decision Making 
 Despite our objections to the rhetorical strategy adopted by Ellis et al., we recognize 
several insights from the evolutionary perspective that are pertinent for either normative or 
individual difference models of adolescent risk behavior. With respect to normative adolescent 
development, Ellis and colleagues provide a strong argument that researchers underestimate the 
importance of adolescents’ status and mating concerns at their own peril. Emphasizing the 
importance of adolescents’ relative success in maximizing social status and ensuring access to 
sexual partners for their ultimate reproductive fitness, the authors suggest that evolutionary 
pressures have selected for a suite of puberty-related changes that dramatically re-orient 
adolescent motivational systems toward pursuit of these relational goals. Although the outsized 
importance of socioemotional concerns to adolescent decision making has been emphasized by 
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others, little work has examined the specific mechanisms by which social motivational factors 
influence adolescents’ risky decision making.  
 We believe that recent improvements in decision-making theory have established a fertile 
ground for exploring these social motivational effects. The decision-making framework 
describes a given choice as resulting from a comparison of the expected values of perceived 
choice options, which are each algorithmically evaluated as a weighted combination of estimated 
costs and benefits in domains relevant to a given decision-maker (e.g., health, safety, parental 
approval, social status, etc.). Importantly, the relative salience of a given evaluative domain – 
that is, the weight it carries in the cost/benefit computation – may vary based on qualities of the 
decision-maker (e.g., developmental stage) and the decision context (e.g., alone vs. with peers). 
From the Ellis et al. perspective, it is likely that adolescents assign much greater weight to the 
perceived social and romantic consequences of a given choice relative to all other evaluative 
domains of a decision. Furthermore, evolutionary theory suggests that variations in local peer 
ecologies (e.g., sex and age composition) should moderate adolescent behavior by influencing 
the motivational salience of social concerns. Recent experimental work on the influence of peer 
context on adolescent decision making support the viability of this broad proposition, showing 
effects of peer observation on adolescents’ preference for immediate (vs. delayed) rewards and 
risky (vs. safe) display behavior (for a review, see Albert & Steinberg, 2011). We agree with 
Ellis et al. that much more work is needed to elucidate age- and context-related variation in 
social motivational dynamics, and the decision-making framework shows great promise as a 
means for evaluating some of the compelling hypotheses suggested by evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary Theory and Individual Differences in Development 
 Ellis et al. draw on Life History Theory to suggest that developmental responses to early 
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adversity – however maladaptive they may appear from a contemporary public health 
perspective – represent functional adaptations to resource-scarce environments that have 
historically increased an individual’s reproductive fitness. Specifically, childhood exposure to 
cues predicting future resource scarcity and/or high probability of morbidity/mortality are 
hypothesized to trigger a coordinated set of psychobiological changes that “speed up” 
development and orient one toward exploitation of immediate resources, even if this strategy 
entails putting oneself at greater risk of immediate or long-term negative consequences. This 
“fast” life history strategy represents a tradeoff in energetic resources away from investing in 
future quality of life (e.g., parental investment, social attachments, etc.) and toward 
maximization of immediate chances for reproduction (e.g., aggressive competition for position in 
dominance hierarchies and access to mates). In the language of self-regulatory theory, the fast 
strategy is analogous to an acquired “reactive” or “impulsive” mode of self-regulation. 
Given the degree to which reactive/impulsive patterns of self-regulation are associated 
with poor outcomes across the developmental continuum, we welcome the novel hypotheses 
suggested by Ellis et al. regarding distinct classes of environmental exposure (i.e., cues of 
morbidity/mortality vs. unpredictability) that might serve as potent predictors of life history 
strategy. Further empirical work identifying the specific “valid and reliable” cues of 
environmental quality that best predict developmental variation in self-regulation could provide 
important targets for prevention efforts, as would research evaluating the possibility of critical 
periods during which an individual’s self-regulatory trajectory (or LH strategy) is more or less 
sensitive to these environmental cues.   
Evolutionary Theory and Practice and Policy 
Perhaps the most important contribution of evolutionary theory will be to clinical practice 
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and social policy. Although developmentalists will point out that some interventions proposed by 
Ellis et al. as emanating from evolutionary theory were, in fact, a product of developmental 
psychopathology (e.g., the Good Behavior Game, social skills training, and mentoring), we see 
enormous potential here and conclude our commentary by highlighting four principles to which 
Ellis et al. lead us and the challenges that remain. 
First, because the early-adolescent push toward risky behavior may be inevitable, 
socializers may be wise to move with, rather than against, this tendency. As Ellis et al. suggest, 
hard-nosed, confrontational approaches such as zero tolerance, stiff punishments for 
misbehavior, and “Just Say No” to drugs may exacerbate rather than mitigate adolescent 
rebellion. In contrast, approaches that facilitate safe ways to explore may prove more successful. 
The challenge that remains is how to engineer the environment to optimize exploration in a safe 
context. Unfortunately, the art of fostering safe exploration is not clear. Should public policy 
allow the exploration of alcohol consumption by 18-year-olds in the “safe” context of the college 
campus? Surely, we cannot allow drug use and cigarette smoking by 16-year-olds because recent 
brain science tells us that adolescents are particularly vulnerable to the pernicious effects of these 
substances. But how do we restrict access, knowing that the very policies that prohibit use render 
use that much more alluring? Policies that rely on wise decision-making by adolescents may 
prove less successful than those that engineer the environment so that safe behavior is the only 
option. We see promise in automobiles that will not start if a high blood-alcohol level is 
displayed by the driver, a market in which cigarettes are so expensive that adolescents cannot 
afford them, and universal birth control. We need to protect adolescents from themselves. 
Second, we should take solace in the fact that, if we stay out of the way, most adolescents 
will turn into responsible adults. We should resist the urge to overreact. This optimistic stance is 
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consistent with evolutionary theory and empirically supported by developmental studies. 
Unfortunately, many public policies respond to adolescent misbehavior in ways that perpetuate 
or even exacerbate maladaptive behavior. Overly stiff sentences for first-time crimes may turn 
otherwise adolescence-limited delinquents into career criminals. Suspending middle-school 
students for unexcused absences may lead them to drop out altogether. Public labeling of 
deviants, aggregation of offenders into all-deviant-group settings, and placement of young minor 
offenders with older more severe offenders, which are our primary public policies today, may 
send adolescents on a trajectory from which they cannot return. Of course, a policy of no 
consequences at all for misbehavior is unacceptable to the public and probably serves 
adolescents poorly. So how do we balance the public need for law and order with the scientific 
knowledge that adolescents are likely to “grow out of” their risky tendencies? 
Third, evolutionary theory does not stipulate that humans grow without nurturing 
transaction with their environment, and so there is an important place for practices and policies 
that promote the development of adolescent self-regulation and decision-making skills. Although 
Ellis et al. make the valuable point that some well-intended interventions may impair normative 
development, this caution should not impede our striving for interventions that do help 
adolescents. Humans have evolved to need environmental scaffolding to support development, 
and adolescence is no different from any other era. Some interventions, such as public education 
for literacy and life skills training for behavioral decision-making, are constructed by cultures to 
enable us to learn the skills that we have evolved. When ordinary universal practices are not 
sufficient or have failed, supplementary clinical interventions are no more extraordinary than 
medicine or diet. Professional therapies such as multisystemic therapy and cognitive-behavior 
therapy have been uniquely tailored to the needs of some adolescents in our culture.  
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Consistent with the theme of moving with rather than against natural tendencies, we 
suggest that strategies that catalyze intrinsic interests will be most successful in developing 
enduring skills. For example, most adolescents want the freedom that comes with a driver’s 
license, even though they are at relatively high risk of dangerous accidents. Increasing the age at 
which licenses are awarded is not likely to become public policy, but the allure of driving can be 
used to teach responsible decision-making. Many states have followed North Carolina’s lead in 
the graduated driver’s license, in which initial licenses are awarded that allow driving only 
before 9pm and with no more than one peer in the automobile. Over time, privileges are 
increased as long as no infractions have occurred, until full licensure. The policy recognizes the 
limited ability of the average adolescent, protects adolescents from themselves, and supports the 
development of skills and responsibility. Similar concepts could guide policies for other risky-
but-important domains such as alcohol consumption, curfews, school completion, sex, and 
independent living. 
Finally, evolutionary theory, along with emerging science in genetics and behavior, tells 
us much about clinical interventions to address individual differences. Our species is diverse by 
the “design” of evolution. Humans respond differently to environmental stimuli. Rather than 
program the same intervention for all adolescents, we can optimize impact by matching 
interventions to the learning style and temperament of the individual. Developmental 
psychopathology tells us that individual differences tend to mimic the variation that is observed 
across development; thus, some individuals may be excessively impulsive whereas others are 
exceedingly cautious, and some may learn best from didactic instruction whereas others learn 
optimally from visceral experience. Genotyping offers the as-yet-unrealized hope for 
“personalized” interventions based on one’s DNA. We are far from there, but we can assess 
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stable differences in learning styles and then match interventions to individuals. Rather than 
force square pegs into round holes, we can embrace differences among individuals as the 
signature of our species and use our evolved capacity to engineer environments in ways to 
enhance individual development. 
Conclusion 
Upon reading Ellis et al., one can readily imagine a conversation between an adolescent 
and her or his parent, in which the adolescent rationalizes last night’s drunkenness and pleads for 
the car keys, an indefinite curfew, and less monitoring of… everything. The parent shakes her 
head skeptically and prays that the teenager (and the parent) survives to adulthood. Ellis et al. try 
to help the parent understand, calm down, become more optimistic, and think about different 
tactics. For this contribution, we congratulate them. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Albert, D., & Steinberg, L. (2011).  Adolescent judgment and decision making.  Journal of 
Research on Adolescence, 21, 211-224. 
Dodge, K.A. (2006). Translational science in action: Hostile attributional style and the 
development of aggressive behavior problems. Development and Psychopathology 18, 
791-814. Steinberg,	L.	(2008).	A	social	neuroscience	perspective	on	adolescent	risk-taking.	
14		
Developmental	Review,	28(1),	78-106.	
 
15		
Footnote 
Dodge acknowledges the support of grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
grants DA016903 and P30DA023026.  
